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Statutory Controls of Damages
In Commercial Transactions
By TERRY BAum* t
Section 3281 of California's Civil Code provides that "Every person
who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another,
may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money,
which is called damages." This section expresses what can be called the
ideal of "perfect compensation": full compensation-no more, no less-
for loss resulting from another's breach of duty. It is conceivable that
the statutory law of damages could stop right there, but in fact Cali-
fornia has a sizable body of statutory law affecting the amount of dam-
ages that can be recovered.
With reference to the statutory treatment of this subject, several
general observations can be made. First, damages have long been a
subject of statutory control in this state. As enacted in 1872, the Civil
Code, in which most provisions controlling damages are still found,
contained a rather comprehensive treatment of the subject which was,
for the most part, a codification of common law, offering few, if any,
surprises.1 Second, most of this 1872 body of law remains intact today,
and the amount of supplementary legislation enacted since 1872 has
not been voluminous. If the charge that the law of damages is unsur-
passed for confusion in the entire body of the law 2 applies to California,
there nevertheless has been no irresistible pressure for wholesale re-
vision. Third, while much of the statutory law elaborates on the basic
principle of compensation expressed in section 3281 (for it is not, after
all, always obvious how the ideal of perfect compensation is to be at-
tained) it is apparent that in many instances the Legislature, for
*A.B. 1945, University of California; LL.B. 1949, University of California, Berkeley;
Deputy Legislative Counsel, State of California; Criminal Law Section, American Bar
Association; member, California and United States Supreme Court Bars.
t The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Legislative Counsel.
1 The bulk of these provisions, then as now, were found in CAL. Cry. CoDE §§ 3281-
3360. Some indication whether these code sections were intended to codify the common
law can be found in the annotations to the 1872 Civil Code prepared by Creed Haymond
and John C. Bush, two of the three members of the California Code Commission, in CAL.
Civ. CODE, ANNoT. ED. (Bancroft & Co., Sumner Whitney & Co. 1874). These annota-
tions will be referred to, hereafter, as "Code Commissioners' Notes."
2 Note, 61 HAzv. L. REv. 113 (1947).
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reasons of practicality or achievement of some social purpose, has in-
tentionally deviated from the principle of perfect compensation and
has provided for recoveiy of a greater or lesser amount.
This article is intended to be a brief review of the statutes control-
ling the amount of damages recoverable in actions arising out of "com-
mercial transactions," 3 where damages are recoverable at all, and,
disregarding nice distinctions that can be drawn between damages and
penalties, it will deal also with the latter, where recoverable by private
parties. An attempt has been made to divide the statutes into two
classes: (1) those which appear to be intended to supply a measure
of actual damages, and (2) those which appear to be intended to pro-
vide for a recovery less than, or exceeding actual damages. As will be
suggested, however, appearances can be misleading, and a statute
which guarantees recovery of a seemingly arbitrary sum, such as 250
dollars, regardless of the loss proved in the particular case, may come
closer to compensating a party for his actual losses than a statute, em-
bodying a long-revered principle of the law of damages, which calls
for fine determinations in each case. As the relevant statutes include a
substantially complete statement of the general principles of the law
of damages, it would not be feasible in any article of this size to deal
generally with the cases decided under these statutes, but reference
will be made particularly to cases bearing on the interrelationship of
the statutes and of the different types of damages.
I. The Measure of Actual Damages
Breach of Contract Generally
The Legislature has provided that for the breach of an obligation
arising from contract, the measure of damages, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the Civil Code, is the amount which will compensate the party
aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which,
in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom. 4
Though it may not be obvious, this section has been construed to be a
codification of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale5 so that the basic meas-
ure of damages is such damages as may reasonably be supposed to have
been within the contemplation of the parties, at the time of making of
the contract, as the probable result of a breach, either by reason of
there being damages that naturally flow from a breach, or, if they result
3 For the purposes of this article, "commercial transactions" has been given a some-
what synthetic definition. The article deals with statutes relating to breach of contract and
to other causes of action peculiar to the conduct of a business or considered most likely
to arise in transactions to which a business organization is a party.
4 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3300.
5 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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from special circumstances, because such special circumstances were
communicated to the party who committed the breach. It is apparent
that even this basic measure of damages is a qualification of the rule
of perfect compensation. Evidently for reasons of fairness it was con-
cluded that a party should not be compensated for some detriment
traceable to a breach by the other party where such detriment was not
reasonably foreseeable by the defaulting party,7 although it could be
contended that it would be as fair or fairer to require the defaulting
party to compensate for all losses suffered by the other party, whether
or not foreseeable.
This basic statutory provision by its terms recognizes that the Leg-
islature may otherwise legislate with respect to causes of action within
the scope of the basic rule, and, in fact, the Legislature has done so. It
has, for example, provided that the detriment caused by a breach of an
obligation to pay money only is deemed to be the amount due by the
terms of the obligation, with interest thereon." It has also enacted pro-
visions dealing particularly with the measure of damages for breach of
a contract for the sale of real property or goods and for breach of other
types of contracts.
Real Property Sales
The detriment to the buyer caused by the breach of an agreement
to convey an estate in real property is, by statute, deemed to be the
price paid and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title
and preparing the necessary papers, with interest, plus, if bad faith is
present, the difference between the price agreed to be paid and the
value of the estate agreed to be conveyed, at the time of the breach,
as well as expenses properly incurred in preparing to enter upon the
6 Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150 Cal. 51, 87 Pac. 1093 (1906); see
Mitchel v. Clarke, 71 Cal. 163, 11 Pac 882 (1886). See McCorntcK, DAMAGES § 138
(1935). Section 3300 was amended to read as it now does by Cal. Stat., Code Am. 1873-4,
ch. 612, § 276, p. 265. In the 1872 version the section would seem to have more clearly
expressed the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. It read:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages,
except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which
will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby, which the party in fault had notice, at the time of entering into the
contract, or at any time before the breach, and while it was in his power to
perform the contract upon his part, would be likely to result from such breach,
or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.
For a general discussion of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale see McCoRUICK, DAM-
AGES § 138 (1935).
8 CAL. Crv. CoDE §3302. This section, however, does not apply to a landlord's action
for damages on wrongful abandonment of leased premises. Respini v. Porta, 89 Cal. 464,
26 Pac. 967 (1891).
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land.9 This provision prevails over general rules of damages and, spe-
cifically, over Civil Code section 3300.10 It is provided by statute that
the detriment to the seller caused by the breach of an agreement to
purchase an estate in real property is deemed to be the excess, if any,
of the amount which would have been due to the seller, under the
contract, over the value of the property to him." Also among the 1872
provisions still in effect today which prescribe a measure of damages
are sections, now largely of historical interest, relating to breach of a
covenant of seizin, right to convey, warranty, or quiet enjoyment in
a grant of an estate in real property, 12 breach of a covenant against
encumbrances, 3 and a breach of an agreement to execute and deliver
a quitclaim deed to real property.
14
Sales of Goods
The 1872 Civil Code contained a block of sections relating to dam-
ages for breach of contract for the sale of goods which were repealed
when the Uniform Sales Act was enacted. This repealer would appear
9 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3306. This is the "English Rule," to be contrasted with the
"American Rule." Under the "American Rule," the buyer can recover the difference
between the contract price and market value plus payments that have been made. See
McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 177. It is to be noted that although this section allows interest
on the price paid, it does not provide for interest on the special damages allowed in
cases of bad faith on the part of the vendor. Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot, 144 Cal. App.
2d 755, 778, 301 P.2d 952, 967 (1956).
10 Gorges v. Johnson, 167 Cal. App. 2d 349, 334 P.2d 621 (1959); Crag Lumber Co.
v. Crofoot, 144 Cal. App. 2d 755, 301 P.2d 952 (1956); Rasmussen v. Moe, 138 Cal. App.
2d 499, 292 P.2d 226 (1956).
11 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3353, defining "value to a seller," is not
applicable to real property sales. Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 (1951).
12 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3304. The measure prescribed is:
1. The price paid to the grantor; or, if the breach is partial only, such propor-
tion of the price as the value of the property affected by the breach bore at the
time of the grant to the value of the whole property;
2. Interest thereon for the time during which the grantee derived no benefit
from the property, not exceeding five years;
3. Any expenses properly incurred by the covenantee in defending his possession.
13 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3305. The measure prescribed is:
"... the amount which has been actually expended by the covenantee in ex-
tinguishing either the principal or interest thereof, not exceeding in the former
case a proportion of the price paid to the grantor equivalent to the relative
value at the time of the grant of the property affected by the breach, as com-
pared with the whole, or, in the latter case, interest on a like amount."
14 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3306a. This section is somewhat unusual in that it describes the
"minimum detriment" caused by the breach. This is stated to be ". . . the expenses in-
curred by the promisee in quieting title to the property, and the expenses incidental to
the entry upon such property . . ." which expenses ". . . shall include reasonable attor-
neys' fees..." to be fixed by the court in the quiet title action.
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to be the most sweeping change in the 1872 statutes that has yet been
made.'; The Uniform Sales Act now provides that when the seller is
ready and willing to deliver and requests the buyer to take delivery,
and the buyer does not do so in a reasonable time, he is liable to
the seller for "any loss" occasioned by his neglect or refusal to take
delivery and also for a reasonable charge for care and custody of
I5 This block of sections consisted of CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 3308-3314 as enacted in
1872, which were repealed by Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 1070, p. 2234. Section 3308 provided
that the detriment caused by the breach of a seller's agreement to deliver personal prop-
erty, the price of which has not been fully paid in advance, is deemed to be the excess,
if any, of the value of the property to the buyer over the amount which would have been
due to the seller under the contract, if it had been fulfilled. Section 3309 provided that
the detriment caused by the breach of a seller's agreement to deliver personal property,
the price of which has been fully paid to him in advance, is deemed to be the same as in
wrongful conversion, the measure of damages for conversion being prescribed by CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3336. Section 3310 provided that the detriment caused by the breach of a
buyer's agreement to accept and pay for personal property, the title to which is vested in
him, is deemed to be the contract price. Section 3311 provided that the detriment caused
by the breach of a buyer's agreement to accept and pay for personal property, the title
to which is not vested in him is, if the property has been resold to satisfy the seller's lien,
the excess, if any, of the amount due from the buyer under the contract over the net pro-
ceeds of the resale. Or, if the property has not been so resold, the detriment is the excess,
if any, of the amount due under the contract over value to the seller, together with the
excess, if any, of expenses properly incurred in carrying the property to market over those
which would have been incurred for carriage if the buyer had accepted it. Section 3312
provided that the detriment caused by the breach of a warranty of title of personal prop-
erty sold is the value to the buyer when he is deprived of possession, plus costs he must
pay in an action by the true owner. Section 3313 provided that the detriment caused by
the breach of a warranty of the quality of personal property is the excess, if any, of the
value which the property would have had at the time to which the warranty referred, if
it had been complied with, over its actual value at that time. Section 3314 provided that
the detriment caused by the breach of a warranty of fitness of an article of personal prop-
erty for a particular purpose is the same as that provided by § 3313, together with fair
compensation for loss incurred by an effort in good faith to use it for such purpose.
An incidental effect of the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act and repeal of earlier-
enacted sections governing measure of damages in the same field was to reduce drastically
the importance of CAL. Crv. CODE § 3353. That section, still in effect, provides that in
estimating damages, the "value of property to a seller" thereof is deemed to be the price
which could have been obtained therefore in the market nearest to the place at which it
should have been accepted by the buyer, and at such time after the breach of the contract
as would have sufficed, with reasonable diligence, for the seller to effect a resale. "Value
to the seller" was a factor in computation of damages under former CAL. CIV. CODE § 3311
as enacted in 1872 but is not a factor under CAL. Civ. CODE § 1784, and in an action for
damages for nonacceptance of goods, it is error to apply § 3353. S. P. Milling Co. v.
Billiwhack etc. Farm, 50 Cal. App. 2d 79, 122 P.2d 650 (1942). Sections 3354-3356,
also defining value for particular purposes, would appear to have greater current vitality.
Section 3354 relates to value of property to an owner, as well as a buyer, for deprivation
of possession; §3355 relates to damages for deprivation of, or injury to, property of pe-
culiar value to the person seeking recovery of damages; and § 3356 relates generally to
the value of an instrument in writing.
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the goods.", Where the seller is not paid, he may maintain an action
for the price of the goods under the terms of the contract.' Where the
buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods,
the seller may maintain an action against him for damages for non-
acceptance, and the measure of damages is the estimated loss directly
and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the
buyer's breach. Where, in such cases, there is an available market for the
goods, the measure, in the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damage of a greater amount, is the difference between the
contract price and the market or current price when the goods ought
to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at
the time of refusal to accept.' 8
Where the property in the goods has not passed to the buyer and
the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer
may maintain an action for damages for nondelivery, and the measure
of damages is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the seller's breach. If, in such cases, there is an
available market for the goods, the measure, in the absence of special
circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount, is the
difference between the contract price and the market or current price
of the goods at the time when they should have been delivered or, if
no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver.' 9 In an
action by the buyer for damages for breach of warranty by the seller,
the measure of damages is the loss directly and naturally resulting in
the ordinary course of events from the breach of warranty; and, more
specifically, in the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in
the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a
greater amount, is the difference between the value of the goods at the
16 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1771.
17 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1783.
18 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1784. The general principle of the duty of the aggrieved party
to mitigate damages is not, as such, expressly codified. It is, apparently, a corollary of the
principle that the defaulting party is liable only for such loss as is proximately caused by
his breach. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3300, 3333; Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840,
846; 147 p.2d 558, 561 (1944) (dictum); Winans v. Sierra Lumber Co., 66 Cal. 61, 4
Pac. 952 (1884) (dictum). It is expressly codified in § 1784(4) with respect to damages
for nonacceptance of goods. That section provides:
If, while labor or expense of material amount are necessary on the part of the
seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale,
the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the seller to proceed no
further therewith, the buyer shall be liable to the seller for no greater damages
than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing towards carrying out the
contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or counter-
mand. The profit the seller would have made if the contract or the sale had
been fully performed shall be considered in estimating such damages.
19 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1787.
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time of delivery and the value they would have had if they had an-
swered to the warranty.20 It is specified by statute that the Uniform
Sales Act does not affect the right of the buyer or seller to recover
interest or special damages in any case where, by law, interest or spe-
cial damages may be recoverable.
21
Carriers
Of less general interest than the statutes discussed above, but as
venerable as any of them, are several sections, dating back to the Civil
Code as first enacted, relating particularly to carriers. They specify that
the measure of damages for a carrier's breach of his obligation to accept
freight, messages, or passengers is the difference between the amount
which he had a right to charge for the carriage and the amount which
it would be necessary to pay for the service when it ought to be per-
formed;2 2 that the measure for breach of a carrier's obligation to deliver
freight is the value thereof at the place and on the day at which it
should have been delivered, deducting the freightage to which he
would have been entitled if he had completed the delivery;23 and that
the measure for a carrier's delay in delivery of freight is the deprecia-
tion in the intrinsic value of the freight during the delay.24 Liability of
common carriers for loss of or injury to baggage and certain types of
freight is referred to below in the discussion of statutes limiting recov-
erable damages by fixed dollar amounts.
Fraud-Retrospective Operation
Of a New Measure of Damages
If major changes in the statutes governing measure of damages are
infrequent, they do, at least, occur sometimes, and have occurred with-
in the memory of men now living. A major change was effected in 1935
when the Legislature enacted section 3343 of the Civil Code, providing
that a person defrauded in the purchase, sale, or exchange of property
is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that
which the defrauded person parted with and the actual value of that
which he received, together with any additional damage arising from
the particular transaction, thus substituting the "out-of-pocket loss"
20 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1789.
21 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1790.
22 CAL. CrV. CODE § 3315.
2 3 
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3316.
24 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3317. This measure is not exclusive, however. It applies only
when appropriate, i.e., when the goods are perishable or have a market value for the use
intended, by which their value can be determined. It did not apply in a case of delay in
delivery of scenery and costumes for a play, requiring cancellation of the opening night
performance. Artists' Embassy v. Hunt, 157 Cal. App. 2d 371, 320 P.2d 924 (1958).
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rule for the "loss-of-the-bargain" rule.25 The new section contained, as
it does now, the statement that "Nothing herein contained shall be
deemed to deny to any person having a cause of action for fraud or
deceit any legal or equitable remedies to which such person may be
entitled."
The enactment of this section resulted in litigation on an issue likely
to be presented in any case in which the measure of damages is changed
by statute, namely, whether the new measure of damages applies to
pending litigation or to causes of action existing at the time of the
enactment which are not yet the subject of litigation. Very rarely does
the Legislature state expressly whether a new measure of damages, or,
for that matter, any other change in the law, is intended to apply or
not to apply to existing causes of action or pending litigation.2 6 In
Feckenscher v. Gamble,27 the California Supreme Court concluded
that the new measure was intended to apply in a case in which the
new section became effective after the cause of action had arisen but
before the trial commenced, and the quoted sentence in section 3343
did not evidence a contrary intent. Further, such application of the
new measure, as it did not deprive plaintiff of a vested right, was
constitutional.
Interest
On a selective basis the Legislature has provided for recovery of
25 Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948); Jacobs v. Levin,
58 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 913, 137 P.2d 500 (1943). Under the "out-of-pocket loss" rule
the plaintiff can recover the difference between the value of that with which he parted
and the value of that which he received. Under the "loss-of-the-bargain" rule he can
recover the difference between the value of the property received and the value that it
would have had if it had been as represented. Jacobs v. Levin, supra. Although CAL. Crv.
CODE § 3343 precludes application of the "loss-of-the-bargain" rule it does not preclude
recovery of exemplary damages. Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980
(1945). Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959) illustrates that a plaintiff,
by suing on the theory of unjust enrichment, may recover substantial damages in a fraud
case, though, if the "out-of-pocket loss" rule were applied, he could show no actual dam-
ages; and, moreover, he can recover exemplary damages in such a case. CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 3294, permitting recovery of exemplary damages only in an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, does not preclude recovery of such damages in a
case in which the obligation is one imposed by law.
26 In 1959 the Legislature amended CAL. Bus. & PROF. C. § 16750 to authorize re-
covery of treble, rather than double, actual damages for the unfair trade practices to
which the section relates (Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2078, p. 4811). In this case the Legislature
expressly provided that "The amendments to this section adopted at the 1959 Regular
Session of the Legislature do not apply to any action commenced prior to September 18,
1959." A similar provision is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. C. § 17082, as amended in 1959
(Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2074, p. 4806).
27 12 Cal. 2d 482, 85 P.2d 885 (1938).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
interest from the time of a breach.28 Civil Code section 3287, the sec-
tion of broadest significance for the purposes of actions arising out of
commercial transactions, provides that every person who is entitled to
recover "damages certain" or capable of being made certain by cal-
culation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a par-
ticular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day,
except during such time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the
act of the creditor, from paying the debt. This is another instance of
a statute that would seem to depart from the ideal of perfect compen-
sation, apparently for reasons of what is deemed fairness, i.e., the belief
that interest should not be awarded when the defaulting party did not
know just how much was owing.29 This section was broadened in 1955
to apply to recovery of damages from any political subdivision of the
state,80 and was further broadened in 1959 to apply to recovery of
damages from the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal
corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision
of the state, 1 which would seem to be about as broad language as could
be used to cover governmental agencies generally. Civil Code section
3302 specifically authorizes recovery of interest in an action for breach
28 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3357 provides that the damages prescribed by CAL. Crv. CODE
§§ 3300-3360 are exclusive of interest and exemplary damages, except where "expressly
mentioned." This chapter is titled "Measure of Damages" and contains the bulk of Cali-
fornia statutes relating to that subject. Thus, by reason of this section, interest is not
allowed for breach of an agreement to convey real property, the measure for which is
prescribed by § 3306, which section does not mention interest. Boshes v. Miller, 119 Cal.
App. 2d 332, 259 P.2d 447 (1953). However, § 3357 is not quite as restrictive as it ap-
pears to be, on its face. Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945)
involved an action for fraud, for which § 3343, part of the chapter in which § 3357 is
found, states the applicable measure of damages. Appellants urged that § 3343 makes no ex-
press mention of interest and exemplary damages and thus § 3288, relating to interest, and
§ 3294, relating to exemplary damages, found in the preceding chapter, were inapplicable.
The court found sufficient authorization for awarding of interest and exemplary damages
in the last paragraph of § 3343, providing that "Nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to deny to any person having a cause of action for fraud or deceit any legal or equitable
remedies to which such person may be entitled." But this language does not authorize
application of another measure of damages than that prescribed by § 3343. Bagdasarian
v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 194 P.2d 935 (1948).
29 The certainty requirement has been criticized in Apel, Interest as Damages in
California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 262 (1958), which contains an excellent critical discussion
of the interrelationship of California's statutes governing interest as an element of damages.
30 Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1477, p. 2689. Prior to this amendment, the section was, for
example, held inapplicable to actions against a county. Hopkins v. Contra Costa County,
106 Cal 566, 39 Pac. 933 (1895).
31 Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1735, p. 4186. It was held that during the period between the
1955 amendment and the 1959 amendment, recovery of interest in an action against a
city was not authorized, a city not being a "political subdivision" within the meaning of
the language added in 1955. Abbott v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal. App. 2d 511, 332
P.2d 324 (1959).
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of an obligation to pay money only. This section, which has been con-
strued to apply only to contractual relations and not torts, 32 has appar-
ently been construed also as subject to the certainty requirement of
section 3287. 33 Section 3288 of the Civil Code provides that in an action
for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every
case of oppression, fraud or malice, interest may be given, in the dis-
cretion of the jury. Though the latter part of the section could be read
as authorizing recovery of interest in cases of all types in which oppres-
sion, fraud, or malice is present, apparently no part of this section is
applicable to contract actions.3 4 Recovery of interest is authorized also
for a breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment and the other covenants
named in section 3304 of the Civil Code.
It is provided by statute that any legal rate of interest stipulated
by a contract remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as before,
until the contract is superseded by a verdict or other new obligation, 36
but otherwise the measure of damages statutes are silent on the rate of
interest to be applied. Generally, the courts have applied the "legal"
rate of interest, i.e., seven per cent.
37
General Overriding Provisions
Certain general statutory provisions have an overriding limiting
effect on the amount of damages recoverable. No damages can be re-
32 Siminoff v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 Pac. 939 (1912).
33 See discussion in Apel, Interest as Damages in California, supra note 29 at 269.
In the Siminoff case, supra note 32, the court describes it as relating to breach of a con-
tract providing for payment of a liquidated sum.
34 The latter part of the section could be read as not restricted to obligations "not
arising from contract," but apparently this is not correct. In McNulty v. Copp, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 697, 712, 271 P.2d 90, 100 (1954), the court stated that "Section 3288 of the
Civil Code allows the jury to award interest in an action on tort in every case of oppres-
sion, 'fraud or malice.'" In Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal App. 2d 371, 385, 159 P.2d 980,
987 (1945), the court stated with reference, generally, to § 3288 and § 3294 that "those
sections limit the right to recover exemplary damages and interest, in the discretion of the
jury, to cases based on tort and exclude contract actions." But the courts have not con-
strued § 3287 as applicable exclusively to contract actions. See Tevis v. Beigel, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 90, 344 P.2d 360 (1959).
35 Interest is allowed on the price for the time during which the grantee derived no
benefit from the property, not exceeding five years.
36 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3289.
37 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22, provides that "... the rate of interest upon the loan or
forbearance of any money . . . or on accounts after demand or judgment rendered in any
court of the State, shall be 7 per cent per annum" unless the parties provide for another
rate not to exceed 10 per cent. Most of the reported cases in which interest was awarded
do not state what the rate was. Taking as a sampling the cases decided during the past
five years in which the rate is indicated, it appears in all cases to have been 7 per cent
when the contract did not itself fix the rate. See Lund v. Cooper, 159 Cal. App. 2d 349,
324 P.2d 62 (1958); Nathanson v. Murphy, 147 Cal. App. 2d 462, 305 P.2d 710 (1957);
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 139 Cal. App. 2d 580, 294 P.2d 1140 (1956).
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covered, for a breach of contract, which are not clearly ascertainable
in both their nature and origin,38 but it has repeatedly been held that
this rule does not mean that a person guilty of a breach can escape
payment of damages because damages are difficult to ascertain,3 9 or
cannot be computed precisely.40 It is also provided by statute that
future damages are recoverable if they are certain to result,41 though
as interpreted this requirement is satisfied if it is "reasonably certain"
that substantial future damages will result.
42
Civil Code section 3358 provides that "Notwithstanding the pro-
visions of this chapter [i.e., re measure of damages] no person can re-
cover a greater amount in damages for the breach of obligation than
he could have gained by a full performance thereof on both sides...,"
with exceptions for exemplary and penal damages. Particularly because
this section begins with the clause, "Notwithstanding the provisions of
this chapter," there is an implication that other provisions of the chapter
provide for greater damages.43 There does not appear to be any re-
ported case in which the court stated that the measure of damages
would have been different had there been no section 3358. In the typ-
ical case, the basic provision in point is Civil Code section 3300, stating
the general measure of damages for breach of contract, and the court
cites section 3358 for verification of its interpretation of section 3300.44
Civil Code section 3359 provides that damages must, in all cases,
3 8 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3301.
39 E.g., California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 289 P.2d
785 (1955); Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943).
4 0 E.g., Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 89 P.2d 386
(1939).
4 1 
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3283.
4 2 Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 773 (1949).
43 "Notwithstanding any other provision of law" (this code, this chapter, this article,
etc.) is a common cich6 of legislative drafting. It gives the draftsman peace of mind and,
though not as neat as amending the sections to be overridden, it accomplishes the purpose
that the section containing the clause prevail over any contrary provisions. However, it
may sometime be used out of an abundance of caution, the draftsman not being certain
that there are contrary provisions in the laws, and thus may be puzzling to the reader.
Occasionally, attempts are made to eliminate such clauses where they serve no purpose
(e.g. Cal. Stat. 1959, chs. 85, 182, pp. 1941, 2078).
44 E.g., Comunale v. Travelers & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Phalanx Air Freight v. Nat. Etc. Freight, 104 Cal. App. 2d 771, 232 P.2d 510
(1951); Avery v. Fredericksen and Westbrook, 67 Cal. App. 2d 334, 154 P.2d 41 (1944).
In Palm v. Planada Development Corp., 175 Cal. 771, 773, 167 P.2d 381, 382 (1947),
the court said with reference to the purpose of § 3358:
The Civil Code (Section 3000) declares that for the breach of an obligation
arising on contract, the measure of damages is the amount which will compen-
sate the party aggrieved for all detriment proximately caused thereby; and that
there may be no manner of doubt as to the interpretation to be put upon this
language, section 3358 of the same code further declares ....
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be reasonable, and where an obligation of any kind appears to create
a right to unconscionable and grossly oppressive damages, contrary to
substantial justice, no more than reasonable damages can be recovered.
In contrast with Civil Code section 3358, discussed in the preceding
paragraph, it is clear that this section sometimes can materially affect
the amount of damages recoverable. Though this section is most often
cited in tort cases, 45 it also has application to contract actions, requir-
ing the awarding of lesser damages than would be proper under the
otherwise applicable measure of damages, where the contract itself is
unconscionable.
46
The Legislature has generally declared void any contract provision
fixing the amount of damages to be paid for a breach,47 but it has
given force to such provisions where, from the nature of the case, it
would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the damage,48 and
in some instances it has sanctioned liquidated damages provisions with-
out spelling out a requirement of impracticability or extreme difficulty
of fixing damages as a prerequisite to validity of such provisions.
49
Though they may be in the area of statutes denying the existence
of a cause of action, generally beyond the scope of this discussion,
mention should, perhaps, be made of the instances in which the Legis-
lature has concluded that with respect to secured obligations, creditors
must rely exclusively on their security, as in the case of sale of real
property under a purchase mortgage or deed of trust,50 or under a
power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust,51 or when the buyer has
paid 80 per cent or more of the time sale price in a transaction subject
4 5 E.g., Bellman v. S. F. H. S. Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938).
46 Newmire v. Ford, 22 Cal. App. 712, 136 Pac. 725 (1913). The Code Commis-
sioners' Note to § 3359 contains an interesting example of the type of case in which the
rule of the section can determine allowable damages. The commissioners describe the
case of James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1663), as follows:
".... the defendant had agreed to pay, for a horse sold to him, a farthing for his
first shoe nail, two farthings for the second, four for the third, and so on, for the
thirty-two nails in the horse's shoes. This, of course, amounted to many thous-
and pounds sterling, for which the plaintiff sued. But the court directed the
jury to assess the damages at the actual value of the horse, which was found
to be eight pounds."
47 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1670.
48 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1671.
49 E.g., CAL. AGRIC. C. § 1209 (nonprofit co-operative associations), § 2709 (Cali-
fornia Agricultural Products Marketing Law of 1937), § 3214 (California Agricultural
Products Marketing Law of 1943), CAL. CORP. C. § 13353 (Fish Marketing Act). It has
been suggested that these provisions imply legislative findings that in the situations to
which these provisions apply, the conditions described by CAL. CIv. CODE § 1671 exist.
See Olson v. Biola Coop. Raisin Growers Ass'n, 33 Cal. 2d 664, 204 P.2d 10 (1949).
5 0 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 580b.
51 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580d.
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to the Unruh Act and the seller elects to repossess the goods.52
II. Damages Other Than Actual Damages
In quite a few cases the Legislature has departed, or has at least
appeared to depart, from a theory of perfect compensation by permit-
ting the award of damages, in an amount to be determined by the jury
or judge, in addition to, or in the absence of, actual damages, or by
providing for award of a penalty, in a fixed amount, to the aggrieved
party, or by guaranteeing recovery of a fixed sum in addition to actual
damages or of a multiple of actual damages. In other instances the
Legislature has imposed an upper monetary limit on the amount of
actual damages that may be awarded.
Nominal Damages
Civil Code section 3360 provides that "When a breach of duty has
caused no appreciable detriment to the party affected, he may yet re-
cover nominal damages." Perhaps it is not as clear from this statute as
might be desired whether nominal damages can be recovered even if
it is conceded that no actual detriment was suffered or, on the other
hand, such damages are recoverable only if some proof is offered that
actual detriment was suffered, though compensatory damages cannot
be awarded because, for example, the requirement of certainty is not
met. It is clear from the cases, however, that there is a right to nominal
damages for breach of contract though no actual detriment was suf-
ered,53 and the rule is the same in cases of intentional tort,54 but contra
in negligence cases.55
Exemplary Damages
The Legislature has authorized awarding of "exemplary" (or "puni-
tive") damages where defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
ti2 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.5. The Unruh Act (CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1801-1812.9) en-
acted in 1959 (CAL. STAT. 1959, c. 201, p. 2092) generally governs credit sales of con-
sumer goods and services, both of the conditional sale contract and revolving account
types, with respect to form of the contract, allowable service charges, manner of repos-
session, and other matters. It does not apply to motor vehicles required to be registered
under the Vehicle Code (CAL. CirV. CODE § 1802.1), and transactions relating to such
vehicles remain subject to CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 2981-2982.5. The Unruh Act, incidentally,
contains no general exclusion of the services of lawyers.
53 Sweet v. Johnson, 169 Cal. App. 2d 630, 337 P.2d 499 (1959). But this same
case reiterates the rule that failure to award nominal damages is not alone ground for
reversal of a judgment or for a new trial unless nominal damages in the given case
would carry costs, or the object of the action is to determine some question of permanent
right.
54 Maher v. Wilson, 139 Cal. 520, 73 Pac. 466 (1903); Crane v. Heine, 35 Cal.
App. 466, 170 Pac. 433 (1917).
55 Fields v. Napa Milling Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 442, 330 P.2d 459 (1958).
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or malice, but only in actions for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, and thus only in a minority of the types of actions within
the scope of this article.5 6 Although it is possible to think of a number
of purposes that an award of such damages could serve, and does in
fact serve,57 there at least seems to be no doubt of the Legislature's
view of the matter, as the statute authorizing such damages also de-
clares the award of such damages to be "for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant."58 The recovery of exemplary
damages is dependent on a showing of actual damages, 59 as may be
indicated by the language of Civil Code section 3294, stating that ex-
emplary damages may be recovered "in addition to the actual dam-
ages." Nominal damages will support a recovery of exemplary damages
in a case in which there is a showing of actual damages but their extent
cannot be determined.60 Exemplary damages are never a matter of
right,cl and when awarded must be in reasonable proportion to actual
damages,62 though there is no fixed ratio between the two.63
Penalties
In some instances the Legislature has provided for a penalty in a
flat amount, payable to a private party. 64 Thus, Corporations Code
section 3015 provides that for failure of a corporation, within 30 days
after request therefor, to keep the required share register or books of
account or to prepare or submit required financial statements, it shall
56 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294. Exemplary damages are still recoverable in fraud cases.
See footnote 25, supra.
57 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935). Compare with the discussion in text of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, infra.
58 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294.
59 Contractors' Safety Ass'n of Calif. v. Compensation Insurance Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71,
307 P.2d 626 (1957).
60 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 393, 221 P.2d 965 (1950). In
the Sterling case the court stated, at p. 400:
Nominal damages are not only recovered where no actual damage resulted from
an ascertained violation of right but also where actual damages have been sus-
tained, the extent of which cannot be determined .... The granting of exemp-
lary damages in cases of the latter kind is not inconsistent with the rule that
actual damage is a necessary predicate of punitive damages.... Clearly the case
before us is of the latter kind.
61 Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp., 111 Cal. App. 2d 431, 244 P.2d 764 (1952).
62 Ibid.
63 Ingram v. Higgins, 103 Cal. App. 2d 287, 229 P.2d 305 (1951).
64 There are, of course, numerous statutory provisions for penalties, as distinguished
from fines in criminal cases, payable to the state. These are particularly common in the
laws regulating financial institutions and are usually accompanied by provisions authoriz-
ing compromise by the state; e.g., CAL. Fni. C. § 3376 provides for a penalty payable by
a bank which fails to report loans, as required, to the Superintendent of Banks, and CAL.
F N. C. § 3357 authorizes compromise.
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be liable to the requesting shareholder or shareholders for a penalty
in the amount of ten dollars per day of such failure to act, up to a
maximum of 1,000 dollars, with the proviso that liability for all such
requests made on the same day, for the same act, shall not exceed one
hundred dollars per day.
65
Civil Rights
In other instances, the statutes make provision for recovery by a
private party of a fixed sum in addition to actual damages. An instance
of this which has recently received a good deal of publicity is Civil
Code section 52, which provides that for violation of the rights guar-
anteed by Civil Code section 51 (the Unruh Civil Rights Act), 66 i.e.,
rights to frll and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges or services in "all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever," a person is liable for actual damages and 250 dollars in addition
thereto.7 It can be observed, at the outset, that the nature of the 250
dollars may not be beyond dispute. In most cases we have no evidence
of legislative intent outside a statute itself,68 but it is possible to think
of a number of purposes one or more of which might be served by a
provision for recovery of a fixed sum in addition to actual damages.
It may be that it is recognized that although actual damages are al-
lowed, certain types of damage suffered by plaintiff, for which com-
pensation should be allowed, will not be compensated for under the
general rules of damages, but should be compensated for, and the fixed
sum amounts to a statutorily liquidated sum to compensate for such
damage. 69 The fixed sum may be a rough approximation of attorney's
65 See also CAL. CoRn'. C. § 3016 making a corporation officer liable to an aggrieved
party, for similar penalties, in the event of unreasonable neglect, failure, or refusal to
enter a transfer of shares on the books of the corporation and to issue a share certificate.
66 The name of Assemblyman Jesse M. Unruh is part of the official short title of
two major pieces of legislation enacted in 1959, the other being the Unruh Act (CA-L.
CiV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.9), generally governing retail installment sales of consumer
goods and services.
67 For an interesting discussion of this enactment see Horowitz, The 1959 Equal
Rights in "Business Establishments" Statute-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 So.
CAL. L. REv. 260 (1960).
68 Many attorneys familiar with the Congressional Record and the voluminous re-
ports of congressional committees on bills sent to the floor assume, or hope, that similar
materials exist which will be useful in resolving a question of interpretation of an enact-
ment of the California Legislature. These attorneys are likely to be disappointed, as cor-
responding materials relating to California legislation do not exist. Occasionally, if a bill
resulted from an interim investigation by a legislative committee, useful information can
be found in the interim committee report. Sometimes a statement of intent can be found
in the chapter law adding the section or sections in question. For a general discussion of
extrinsic aids to interpretation of California statutes see Comment, 4 STAN. L. RFv. 367.
09 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2209, relating to damages for refusal or postponement of a
message by a carrier, is similar to CAL. Crv. CODE § 52 in that it provides for recovery
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fees, not otherwise allowable. It may be the result of the conclusion
that persons whose rights are violated should be encouraged to seek
redress, that actual damages for violation of those rights are likely to
be small, and that to induce such aggrieved persons to take action, some
substantial compensation must be guaranteed. And, of course, it may
be designed to punish the defendant and to warn him and others not
to commit or repeat the proscribed act.
A former civil rights statute,70 very similar in its structure to section
52, provided for recovery of "actual damages, and one hundred dollars
in addition thereto," 71 and, in the case of Greenberg v. Western Turf
Assn.,72 the California Supreme Court dealt with the question of the
nature of the guaranteed recovery and the question of its relationship
to punitive damages. In the Greenberg case, defendant took the posi-
tion that the fixed sum amounted to liquidated punitive damages and
therefore punitive damages could not be allowed in addition to the
fixed sum of one hundred dollars. The court disagreed. It described the
one hundred dollars as a penalty, which, it remarked, could as well have
been made payable to the common school fund, but concluded that
it was not the same as punitive damages. It was recoverable without
a showing of oppression or malice and apart from any consideration of
the feelings of the plaintiff. Thus, recovery of exemplary damages under
section 3294 of the Civil Code was not precluded .73
Comparing this type of provision with Civil Code section 3294,
governing exemplary damages, certain differences are evident. The
other conditions of the statute being met, recovery of the 250 dollars
is a matter of right, not one of discretion with the judge or jury, and
the requirement that exemplary damages be proportionate to actual
damages has no parallel here, unless it can be said that the Legislature
of actual damages plus the fixed sum of fifty dollars. In this case the Code Commis-
sioners' Note indicates that the fixed sum was intended to serve the purpose of compen-
sating for nonmonetary detriment, i.e., "annoyance" suffered by reason of delay in delivery
of the message.
70 Cal. Stat. 1893, ch. 185, § 2, p. 220, codified as CAL. Crv. CODE § 54 by Cal.
Stat. 1905, ch. 413, § 4, p. 554, repealed by Cal. Stat. 1959, cl. 1866, p. 4424.
71 The full section read:
Any person who is refused admission to any place of amusement contrary to the
provisions of the last preceding section, is entitled to recover from the pro-
prietor, lessee, or their agents, or from any such person, corporation, or associa-
tion, or the directors thereof, his actual damages, and one hundred dollars in
addition thereto.
72 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050 (1903).
73 It is also established that a statute of this type is not exclusive in the sense of
denying the right to injunctive relief. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110,
180 P.2d 321 (1947).
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prejudged the value of actual detriment and calculated the penalty
accordingly.
Is recovery of the fixed sum under a statute such as Civil Code sec-
tion 52 dependent on a showing of actual damages? It does not appear
that this question has been answered by the courts. It is noted that
section 52 provides for recovery of actual damages and 250 dollars "in
addition thereto," and this language can be contrasted with the lan-
guage of the section as it read prior to amendment in 1959, authorizing
recovery in every case of "damages in an amount not less than one
hundred dollars." Similarly to present section 52 of Civil Code, section
3294, the exemplary damages statute, provides for recovery of such
damages "in addition to actual damages" and the quoted phrase was,
in one case, referred to as a ground for requiring a showing of actual
damages as a prerequisite to recovery of exemplary damages.74 It
would not seem that a section worded as is section 52 must necessarily
be construed as was section 3294 in this case. That is, it would not do
great violence to such a section to read it as providing for recovery of
(1) actual damages, if any, and (2) a penalty of 250 dollars, the latter
being independently recoverable. If it is sought to justify a contrary
conclusion by analogy to the law of exemplary damages, it must be
noted that the requirement of a "showing" of actual damages as a nec-
essary prerequisite to recovery of exemplary damages is a principle
generally recognized in most jurisdictions, apart from the specific word-
ing of any particular statute and even in the absence of any statute
on the subject of exemplary damages.7 5 It is also noted that in a case
in which a purpose of a statute worded like Civil Code section 52 is to
assure a substantial recovery notwithstanding the difficulty of showing
actual damages, such purpose can be defeated by requiring a showing
of actual damages as a prerequisite to recovery of the fixed amount.
Other statutes similar in structure to Civil Code section 52 relate
to refusal of a carrier to carry a message and failure to execute certain
documents pertaining to satisfaction of obligations. 7
74 Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App. 2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953).
75 See Annot., 17 A.L.R. 2d 527 (1949). The issue of a showing of actual damages
as a prerequisite to recovery of the fixed amount under CAL. Civ. CODE § 52 is briefly
touched on in Klein, The California Equal Rights Statutes in Practice, 10 STAN. L. Rv.
253, at 269.
76 CAL. CIv. CODE: § 2209 provides that "Every person whose message is refused or
postponed, contrary to the provisions of this chapter [Ch. 1, Title 8, Pt. 4, Div. 3, Cal.
Civ. Code] is entitled to recover from the carrier his actual damages, and fifty dollars
in addition thereto." The other statutes to which reference is made do not use the phrase
"in addition to." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2941 provides that for refusal to execute a certificate
of discharge of a mortgage or deed of trust or to enter satisfaction, as required, the mort-
gagee, beneficiary or assignee is liable to the mortgagor or trustor or owner for "all
damages which he or they may sustain by reason of such refusal, and shall also forfeit
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Multiple Damages
In a few cases the statutes provide for multiple damages, 77 i.e.,
twice or three times actual damages or some factor related to actual
damages. Recovery of treble the amount of actual damages is author-
ized by Business and Professions Code section 16750, relating to com-
binations for the purpose of price-fixing, decreasing production, and
other purposes in restraint of trade, Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 17082, relating to use of loss leaders and other unfair trade prac-
tices, 78 and in provisions relating to regulation of food warehousemen.79
The statutes provide for recovery of treble the amount of excessive
charges under the usury law,80 and in certain consolidation transactions
under the Unruh Act.8 ' In the field of landlord and tenant, there is
provision for damages in the amount of treble rent.
8 2
to him or them the sum of three hundred dollars." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3024 provides that
for failure to mail or deliver a statement of satisfaction of an obligation secured by an
assignment of accounts receivable, the assignee "shall be liable to the assignor for all
actual direct damages suffered by him as a result of such failure and, if the failure is in
bad faith, for a penalty of one hundred dollars." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3040, relating to
failure to deliver or mail a certificate of satisfaction of an obligation secured by an in-
ventory lien, is similar to § 3024.
77 Art. 3 (commencing with § 3344) of Ch. 2, Title 2, Pt. 1, Div. 4, Civ. Code,
which included provisions of this type relating to holding over by tenants and injuries
to trees is headed "Penal Damages."
78 At a time when § 17082 still provided only for actual damages, it was held that,
the conditions of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 being met, exemplary damages were recover-
able. Sandler v. Gordon, 94 Cal. App. 2d 254, 210 P.2d 314 (1949). It would seem
that this would still be true, unless multiple damages are liquidated exemplary damages.
By analogy to the penalty considered in Greenberg v. Western Turf Assn. (see text,
supra, at note 27), it would seem that they are not. Exemplary damages can be re-
covered in addition to treble interest under the Usury Law. Harris v. Gallant, 183 Cal.
App. 2d . . . , 6 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1960).
79 CAL. PUB. UTIL. C. § 2573.
80 Cal. Stat. 1919, p. lxxxiii (initiative measure approved Nov. 5, 1918).
81 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.9 provides that in case of violation of the provisions of the
Unruh Act relating to time price differential or service charge on a consolidated total of
two or more contracts, the buyer may recover from the person guilty of the violation
three times the total of the time price differential or service charge and any delinquency,
collection, extension, deferral or refinance charge imposed, contracted for or received.
82 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 provides that if any tenant gives notice of his intention to
quit the premises and does not deliver up possession at the time specified in the notice,
he must pay to the landlord treble rent during the time he continues in possession after
such notice. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3345 provides that if any tenant, or any person in collusion
with the tenant, holds over any lands or tenements after demand made and one month's
notice, in writing given, requiring the possession thereof, such persons holding over must
pay to the landlord treble rent during the time he continues in possession after such
notice. Provision for such damages is, of course, found in areas outside the scope of this
article, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3346, relating to injury to trees, which provides, variously,
for actual, double, and treble damages, depending on the gravity of the misconduct;
CAL. PuB. UTIL. C. § 7951, relating to injury to telegraph or telephone or electric power
or gas property, provides for recovery of three times actual damages.
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Attorney's Fees
Although no attempt is made in this article to discuss, generally,
recovery of costs, it would not be inappropriate to refer to the Legis-
lature's treatment of recovery of attorney's fees. Attorney's fees are, of
course, not ordinarily recoverable, but the Legislature has provided for
such recovery in a few cases, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure section 1031,
requiring that an attorney's fee not exceeding twenty per cent of the
amount recovered by the plaintiff, be awarded in an action for recov-
ery of wages for labor performed where the amount of the demand,
exclusive of interest, does not exceed 300 dollars. Provision for award
of attorney's fees is found also in Business and Professions Code sec-
tions 16750 and 17082, relating to combinations in restraint of trade
and unfair trade practices, previously referred to in connection with
multiple damages. It is apparent that the Legislature has been very
selective in allowing such compensation. Further, in each of the in-
stances just cited the plaintiff is awarded an attorney's fee if he pre-
vails, but a corresponding recovery by defendant is not authorized if he
is the prevailing party.83 It can be conjectured that in the case of Code
of Civil Procedure section 1031 recovery of attorney's fees was allowed
because the plaintiff would likely be a person of limited means, or it
would not be worth while to press the claim if an attorney's fee were
not awarded. The same would not seem to be true of the Business and
Professions Code provisions relating to trade restraints and unfair trade
practices. In either case, contrasted with the general rule that a party
cannot recover an attorney's fee, such provisions have the appearance
of penalties, not greatly unlike provisions previously described provid-
ing for recovery of a fixed sum of money in addition to actual damages.
Such provisions authorizing recovery of an attorney's fee by one
party but not the other have not gone unchallenged. Former section
1195 of the Code of Civil Procedure," authorizing recovery of attor-
ney's fees by a successful mechanics' lien claimant, but not by the de-
fendant if he prevailed, was held unconstitutional, 5 although it would
seem that the California Supreme Court has since shown greater liber-
ality toward such legislation."s
83 CAL. Bus. & PRoP. C. § 16750 can be read also as allowing recovery of an attor-
ney's fee by plaintiff even if he does not prevail.
84 Enacted in the Civil Code in 1872, as amended Cal. Stat., Code Am. 1873-74,
oh. 586, § 6, p. 412, Cal. Stat. 1885, ch. 152, § 5, p. 146. The language relating to attor-
ney's fees was deleted in 1911 by Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 681, § 9, p. 1319.
85 Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 150 Cal. 265, 88 Pac. 925 (1907).
8 8 In Municipal Utility District v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 20 Cal. 2d 684, 128
P.2d 529 (1942), the court upheld CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 526b against the contention
of denial of equal protection though, under this section, an attorney's fee is recoverable
only by a defendant in a proceeding to enjoin sale or expenditure of proceeds of securities
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Ceiling on Actual Damages
In contrast to provisions, previously discussed, which authorize
award of a fixed sum in addition to actual damages, there are a few
code provisions found in the laws relating to carriers and other public
utilities, and the laws relating to innkeepers, which impose a monetary
limit on actual damages, absent an agreement to the contrary. For
example, it is provided by statute that the liability of any stage line,
transfer company, or other common carrier operating over the public
highways for the loss of or damage to any baggage shall not exceed
one hundred dollars for each trunk and its contents, and lesser limits
apply to other items, unless a higher valuation is declared at the time
of delivery of such baggage to the carrier and assented thereto in writ-
ing by such carrier.87 Similar provisions are found in Civil Code sec-
tions 1859 and 1860, governing innkeepers and operators of rest homes
and like establishments. Perhaps such limitations can be viewed as
predeterminations by the Legislature of the amount of damages rea-
sonably foreseeable by the party sought to be held liable. Suggesting
either that they were not that originally or that they no longer accu-
rately measure foreseeable damages is the fact that such limitations,
like the penalties recoverable in addition to actual damages, have
remained unchanged over remarkably long periods, notwithstanding
changes in economic conditions.
88
III. Conclusion
California has a considerable number of statutes governing the
of a public agency issued for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, or improving public
utility works or property and only if the plaintiff is in a public utility business of the
same nature as that for which the securities are to be issued.
87 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2205. Also, CAL. CIv. CODE § 2200 reads:
A common carrier of gold, silver, platina, or precious stones, or of imitations
thereof, in a manufactured or unmanufactured state; of time-pieces of any de-
scription; of negotiable paper or other valuable writings; of pictures, glass, or
chinaware; of statutary, silk, or laces; or of plated ware of any kind, is not liable
for more than fifty dollars upon the loss or injury of any one package of such
articles, unless he has notice, upon his receipt thereof, by mark upon the pack-
age or otherwise, of the nature of the freight; nor is such carrier liable upon any
package carried for more than the value of the articles named in the receipt or
the bill of lading.
88 For example, the sum mentioned in CAL. CIV. CODE § 2200 has remained un-
changed since enactment in 1872, and the limits in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1859 on liability
per item of baggage, have remained unchanged since 1895. Similarly the sum which
under CAL. CiV. CODE § 2209, is recoverable for a carrier's refusal or postponing of a
message has remained unchanged since 1872. This tendency of specific dollar amounts
in the statutes to ossify is noticeable also in other fields. Thus, $500 has remained the
maximum amount of a fine for a misdemeanor, except where otherwise specially provided
(and there is usually no such special provision), since 1872. CAL. PEN. CODE § 19.
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amount of damages recoverable in commercial transactions, some of
which express principles of the law of damages antedating the statutes
while others set forth rules which are innovations by the Legislature.
The statutes would seem to be a logical starting point for research
and, sometimes, will be only a starting point. In some instances the
principle stated in a code section is, unavoidably, so inexact that exam-
ination of the cases interpreting the section is quite essential to appli-
cation of the statute to a specific situation. And the interrelationship
of the various statutes in the field is, to a large extent, determined by
case law (and is not always clearly determined by either statute or case
law). If the statutes do not solve all problems it is at least clear that it
could be fatal to disregard the statutes and to proceed on the theory
that the law provides for perfect compensation, i.e., compensation ex-
actly equal to loss. Intentionally or otherwise the Legislature has, in
numerous instances, provided, or appeared to provide, for more or less
than such perfect compensation.
When working with these statutes certain possibilities should be
kept in mind. A literally applicable general statute may in fact be in-
applicable because a more specialized statute prevails over it. 9 Even a
statute which appears to have been tailored for the type of case at
hand may be inapplicable because it has been construed to be appli-
cable only where "appropriate," and the case at hand is one in which
its application is inappropriate.90 And if it is established that the stat-
ute is in point, it nevertheless may not tell the whole story. Other
statutes, such as those relating to interest and exemplary damages, may
grant a right to additional damages.
89 See, e.g., text at note 10 supra.
90 See, e.g., note 24 supra.
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